I think both the majority and the dissent incorrectly applied the reasoning of Grady v. Grady, 295 Ark. 94, 747 S.W.2d 77 (1988) (allowing the imputation of additional income to a party in determining support awards) in this case, although I think the majority reached a correct result.

The majority seemed to interpret Grady as allowing the imputation of income primarily - if not exclusively - where there was an award of child support. The dissent, on the other hand, seemed to interpret Grady to mean that imputing additional income was appropriate whenever the party paying alimony had lost their job through some fault of their own.

Like I say, I think they both missed the bus. Grady, in my opinion, stands for the proposition that under some circumstances it is proper to impute additional income based on a party's earnings capability rather than actual earnings -- those circumstances being where that party voluntarily chooses to earn less. I think the majority incorrectly limited this to child support, but I think the dissent is even further off base in this case because -- at least from what is apparent in the opinion -- there did not seem to be any evidence that Morse could earn more than what he was earning, only that at some point in the past he had earned more. While it may have been his fault that he lost his driver's license, and thus his job, it does not follow that he is therefore somehow choosing to earn less than he would otherwise, nor does it follow that he has the capability of earning more. The dissent's position seems decidedly punative, punishing a party for something that may have been their fault but which is not necessarily within their power to correct. The purpose of alimony is to rectify economic imbalance, not punish a party indefinitely for a lapse of judgment.

I think that I would have remanded this case, as the majority did, but specifically for findings as to: (1) whether Morse losing his job in Louisiana equates to him voluntarily choosing a lower paying job; and (2) Morse's earning capacity. If he is earning at or near his capacity, alimony should be eliminated; if not, the alimony award should be set based on that earning capacity.

I think the dissent was also wrong in claiming that the majority's consideration of Chapman's financial need was somehow an improper shifting of the burden of proof. Morse, as the one claiming changed circumstances, had the burden to show changed circumstances. Once he had done that, though (which I think he did), the alimony question is open and all the factors relevant to an award of alimony are properly considered.

[As an aside, MILES gear (which the trial court apparently did not understand, calling it "miles gear") is very specialized, complicated laser-tag equipment used in military war games exercises (I believe the acronym stands for Military Infrared Laser Equipment System). As Morse testified, his experience with MILES gear would not translate well to any civilian occupation.]